| Instances to Populations <br> (Nisbett and Ross) |
| :---: |
| - Sample size; e.g. more weight to personal |
| recommend than to mean of many |
| evaluations |
| - Sample bias - don't appreciate importance |
| of random selection |
| • Questioner vs Respondent intelligence |
| - Prison guard study - made inference even when |
| told atypical |
| Paul whitmore, c2003 |

$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

- Sample bias - don't appreciate importance of random selection
- Questioner vs Respondent intelligence

Prison guard study - made inference even when told atypical
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

Covariation as flawed anchor
(Nisbett and Ross)

From four-cell tables
People can't do it = use only prep/prep cell or post 2 cells - but need all

Illusory correlation

- With no theory, people don't detect much co variation
- Around $\mathrm{r}=.85$ to .9 before use upper half of 100 pt scale
- When theory at outset, detect a correlation even when little really exists - shows people use theories, not data

| II. Research on intrinsic motivation and flow |
| :---: |
| Connections for Interaction Designers |
|  |

$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

## Brief Description of Utility Theory

- Utility has a diminishing return
- Weber-Fechner law of psychophysics
- Traces to Bernoulli's observation of marginal diminishing returns


## Expected Utility Theory

Expected Utility weighs risk:

- Probability * Outcome = Expected Utility
- $80 \%$ chance $* \$ 100=\$ 80$
- Risk aversion-sure gains preferred
- $\$ 80$ for sure $>80 \%$ chance * $\$ 100$
$\qquad$

Descriptive Choice: Prospect Theory

- Replace $u$ with value function, $V$ defined in gains and losses
- In EUT, are no gains and losses, only final assets
- Based on 2 psychophysical principles
- We adapt to status quo - so we can easily adapt new reference points
- Explains why defined on gains and losses from reference
- We are more sensitive to changes near reference - explains the curvature of the function - both sides are steepest near origin
- E.g., quickly adapt to illumination in dark room and more
E.g., quickly adapt to illumination in
noticeable if add a little light at first
- Steeper loss curve $=$ loss aversion


## Descriptive Choice: Prospect Theory

- Very low probability either grossly overweight or neglected
- Explains gambling and insurance
- overweight of probability means risk aversion for loss (insurance)
- Risk seeking for gain (gamble)

Descriptive Choice: Prospect Theory

- framing and editing: defines acts, outcomes, and contingencies
- coding: determines reference and define above items - often status quo, but may be an expectation
- rounding and simplification: combing nearly identical outcomes
- cancellation of common components
- elimination dominated options
- A given change in p means endpoints has bigger impact than in middle
- Because most sensitive to changes mean reference point - and 0 or 1 are both natural reference points
CHI 2003 Tutorial Paul Whitmore, ©2003 29


## Intertemporal Choice

Problems that arise in decisions made over time

- Discount delayed rewards
- Problems of aggregation
- The need to plan $\qquad$
- Predict future taste
- Impatience and self-control
$\qquad$

CHI 2003 Tutorial Paul Whitmore, 02003
${ }^{30}$

## Mental Accounting

The way individuals and households make trade-offs

- Understanding mental accounting helps understand choice
- Mental accounting rules are not "neutral"
- They influence what people believe they have and can afford.


## Mental Accounting

- Violate economic notion of fungibility (money has no labels: money is one \#).
- Instead, money in one account is not a substitute for money in any other account.
- Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) sensitive to current income
$\qquad$
CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003


## Three Broad Categories of Mental Accounts

$\qquad$
$\qquad$

- Current Income Account Routinely spent
- checking account, cash MPC $=\sim 1.0$
- Asset Account
- Savings, stocks, bonds For Saving housing
- Future Income Account Rarely spent
- Future income, retirement MPC nearly 0

CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003
33

## Consumption tied to current income

- Spending patterns not smooth
- Changing Social Sec benefits (1965 to 85)
- Over 15 increases, always announced 6-8 wks in advance
- Consumer spending rose after benefits arrive, not when announced
- Similar for anticipated payroll taxes (AER)


## Consumption excessively tied to current income

- Save by transferring to less tempting mental account
- Small gains coded into current income (and spent)
- Larger gains enter assets account where MPC is lower
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$


## Mental accounting

- A realized loss is more painful than a paper loss
- Selling stocks: ought to sell losers (tax), but sell winners (Odean)
- Sunk costs $\qquad$
- Theatre series goers

CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003
${ }^{36}$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$

Mental accounting of gains, losses, costs, and debts can be tricky:

- Health clubs
- Dues charged twice a year
- Attendance highest in the month dues are paid, declines for 5 , and jumps back up
- Credit card debts (while in possession of money in savings)


## Budgeting in Different Accounts "labeling effects"

- In organizations - one dept constrained while another tries to spend
- Spent $\$ 50$ on basketball game / parking ticket: Buy ticket for a play? (control: basketball free)


## Budgeting in Different Accounts

"labeling effects"

- Dutch families that receive child allowance payments:
- Spending on Children's clothing much more sensitive to changes in designated allowance than to other income sources
- Ocean Spray
- \$1 coupon. On that Ocean Spray vs. "any item" in the store
CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003
39
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$
$\qquad$


## A Gamble

- Now suppose that you have the opportunity to play the gamble five times, not just once. Would you play it five times? (63\%)
- Would you prefer to play the gamble five times or six times? (6:70\%)
$\qquad$


## A Gamble

- Suppose you played the gamble [50\% $\qquad$ chance to win $\$ 2000$ and $50 \%$ chance to lose \$500] five times, but you don't yet know your wins and your losses.
- Would you gamble a sixth time? (40\%)
$\qquad$
- As long as don't have to watch each single trial ... $\qquad$

CHI 2003 Tutorial Paul Whitmore, ©2003 42 $\qquad$

## Discount over Time <br> (Lowenstein and Thaler)

- People should discount money at market interest rate of $r$
- Many don't - e.g. overpay taxes and teachers take 12 month salary
- 3 findings
- r declines with time to wait
- $r$ declines as reward increases
$r$ for gains much greater than $r$ for losses - unwilling to pay much to delay a fine
- since $r$ changes with time, reference not consistent - utility curves may cross
- e.g. Christmas clubs and fat farms

CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003
43

## Discount over Time <br> (Lowenstein and Thaler)

$\qquad$

- reference points
- loss aversion: pay less to speed up annual from 4 to 1 week than demand to delay from 1 to 4
- past consumption sets reference - so prefer increasing consumption profile because don't trust self to save
- savoring and dread lead to negative discount rate

CHI 2003 Tutorial
Paul Whitmore, ©2003

## Diversification

- Students selecting among 6 snacks
- Sequential choice: pick one on each of 3 consecutive weekly class meetings
- Simultaneous choice: on first meeting select 3 snacks to be consumed one per week over 3 class meetings
- More variety seeking in simultaneous choice condition ( $64 \%$ chose 3 different) than sequential (9\%)
CH 2003 Tuturial $\quad$ Paul Whitmore, 02003
${ }_{45}$

